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From Crawford v. Washington to
United States v. Hendricks and Beyond:
The Confrontation Clause Confronts
The Federal Rules of Evidence -
Where Are We Now?
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 8, 2004, the United States Supreme Court drastically
changed the application of the Confrontation Clause of the United
States Constitution to criminal cases as it interacts with the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence in the case of Crawford v. Washington.'
Generally, hearsay statements that might have been admitted
under prior Confrontation Clause jurisprudence based on the case
of Ohio v. Roberts2 are no longer admissible if the witness is un-
available to testify at trial and the statement is deemed "testimo-
nial." The Supreme Court left extreme uncertainty as to the dis-
tinction between "testimonial" and "nontestimonial" statements.3
As the lower courts struggle to define the barriers of the Crawford
rule, the question then becomes how practicing attorneys should
handle Crawford's treatment of the Confrontation Clause.
Articles have been written addressing the effect of Crawford on
cases involving domestic violence, child abuse, or other so-called
victimless prosecution cases.4 This comment begins with a brief
background section explaining the pre-Crawford law, the enor-
mous impact that Crawford had on that law, and how the Craw-
1. See Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Revamps Two
Decades of Confrontation Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 2005 S.D. L. REV.
41, 41 (2005).
2. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The rule from Roberts will be discussed in further detail below.
Generally, the rule states that if a witness is available, that witness must testify to satisfy
the confrontation clause; if not available, out-of-court statements may be used in-court and
not violate the confrontation clause if such statements are deemed to have an "indicia of
reliability" or are admitted pursuant to a "firmly rooted exception" to the hearsay rule.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
3. Federal and state courts use "nontestimonial" and "non-testimonial" interchangea-
bly.
4. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 41. See also Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washing-
ton: The End of the Victimless Prosecution, 28 Seattle U. L. REV. 301 (2005); Thomas J.
Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union: Separating the
Confrontation Clause From the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185 (2004).
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ford rule has been interpreted subsequently in the various federal
circuit and Pennsylvania courts. Emphasis is placed on the Third
Circuit's application of Crawford discussed in light of the recent
effect and potential future effect that United States v. Hendricks5
has had, and possibly will have, on Pennsylvania courts' interpre-
tation of the Crawford rule.
II. BACKGROUND TO CRAWFORD:
OHIO V. ROBERTS AND LILLY V. VIRGINIA
Prior to Crawford v. Washington,6 Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence was governed by the case of Ohio v. Roberts.7 The Con-
frontation Clause rule derived from Roberts was very much inter-
twined with the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 The
out-of-court testimony at issue in Roberts was given by the defen-
dant's daughter at his preliminary hearing.9 The defendant had
been prosecuted for using his daughter's credit card without au-
thorization." When he called his daughter to testify at the pre-
liminary hearing, she did so, but without giving any exculpatory
evidence. "
At the time of trial, the daughter was unavailable to testify, 2 so
the government attempted to introduce her preliminary hearing
testimony against the defendant." Rather than exclude the evi-
dence because the defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, the Supreme Court admitted it on the basis
that the testimony was both necessary and reliable. 4
The famous Confrontation Clause test from Roberts stated that
if a witness was unavailable for trial, an out-of-court statement
may be used if it had sufficient "indicia of reliability." 5 "Indicia of
reliability" may be found when there is either a firmly rooted ex-
ception to the hearsay rule or circumstantial guarantees of trust-
5. 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005).
6. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56.
8. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 41.
9. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. "Between November 1975 and March 1976, five subpoenas for four different trial
dates were issued to Anita at her parents' Ohio residence. The last three carried a written
instruction that Anita should 'call before appearing.' She was not at the residence when
these were executed. She did not telephone and she did not appear at trial." Id.
13. Id. at 59-61.
14. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-73.
15. Id. at 66.
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worthiness of the out-of-court statement at issue. 6 The Supreme
Court explained in Roberts that if an out-of-court statement fell
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or if that statement pos-
sessed circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, then a court
would consider it so reliable that cross-examination would be ren-
dered meaningless.'7
After Roberts, the Confrontation Clause rule was modified. It
was later explained that the availability of a witness was signifi-
cant only as or when as indicated by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 8 For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence make it clear
that prior statements by a witness admitted under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1) are admitted as non-hearsay, and availability
is required."
By 1999, the courts had retreated from the Roberts rule. In
Lilly v. Virginia,2" the Court applied the Roberts test to hearsay
admissible as a declaration against interest.21 In that analysis,
several justices expressed dissatisfaction with the Roberts test,
stating that the test was ineffective as mandating compliance with
the Confrontation Clause.22 In response to the Supreme Court's
general abhorrence for the Roberts rule and the Justices' reluc-
tance in following it, Roberts was overruled five years later in
Crawford v. Washington.2
16. Id. The "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" category was meant to
encompass the "firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule" category. See Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990).
17. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1992).
18. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 43-44. See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
19. FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
20. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
21. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). This rule provides that a declaration against interest
is:
a statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the decla-
rant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the decla-
rant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not
have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trust-
worthiness of the statement.
Id.
22. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116. The United States Supreme Court reversed the state su-
preme court and held that an admission of a declaration against interest violated the de-
fendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 139-40. The Court found that the
declaration against penal interest category is not based on an assumption that all state-
ments are trustworthy, but is instead based on the common sense notion that one is
unlikely to make up a statement that goes against his own interest. Id. at 126-27.
23. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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III. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court finally acted on
its distaste for the Roberts rule.2 4 In that case, petitioner Michael
Crawford stabbed a man who supposedly raped his wife, Sylvia.25
At trial, Sylvia was unavailable to testify, and the State of Wash-
ington played her tape-recorded statement to the police that de-
tailed the stabbing even though the petitioner had not had an op-
portunity to cross-examine her.26 The Washington Supreme Court
concluded that Sylvia's statement possessed adequate "indicia of
reliability," and thus passing the Roberts test, and that it was
therefore admissible.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court and overruled Roberts with respect to
"testimonial" statements. The Court concluded that the State
should not have been allowed to admit Sylvia's statement against
the petitioner because her recorded statement qualified as testi-
monial evidence, the witness was unavailable to testify at trial,
and the petitioner did not have a prior opportunity to cross-
examine her.28
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia went on at length about
the historical purpose of the Confrontation Clause. He stated:
[Tihe principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal proce-
dure, and particularly its use of ex parte 9 examinations
as evidence against the accused. It was these practices
that the Crown deployed in notorious treason cases like
Raleigh's that the Marian statutes invited; that English
law's assertion of a right to confrontation was meant to
prohibit; and that the founding-era rhetoric decried. The
24. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
25. Id. at 38.
26. Id. The witness, Sylvia, did not testify because of the state marital privilege, which
generally bars a spouse from testifying against other spouse without the other spouse's
consent. Id. at 40.
27. Id. The Washington Supreme Court upheld Crawford's conviction. Id.
28. Id. at 68-69.
29. "Ex parte" means done or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only,
and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 616 (8th ed. 2004).
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Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in
mind.3°
The United States Supreme Court reiterated its rejection of the
position that the Confrontation Clause applied only to in-court
testimony and that its application to out-of-court statements in-
troduced at trial depended upon the "law of Evidence for the time
being." 1 The majority discussed historical sources of the Confron-
tation Clause and explained that there is very little evidence to
suggest that exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay evi-
dence applied to "testimonial" statements against the accused in a
criminal case. 2 The Court gave examples of such exceptions, one
of which included business records or statements in furtherance of
a conspiracy. Other hearsay exceptions that the Court found to
the contrary involved dying declarations33 and forfeiture by
wrongdoing. 4 The majority also emphasized repeatedly that the
Confrontation Clause does not permit the use of out-of-court tes-
timony unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a
35prior opportunity to cross-examine.
The Court went into great detail to explain the importance of
Confrontation Clause rights in light of "testimonial" statements,
stating:
Involvement of government officers in a production of tes-
timony with an eye toward trial presents unique poten-
tial for prosecutorial abuse - a fact borne out time and
time again throughout a history with which the Framers
were keenly familiar. This consideration does not evapo-
rate when testimony happens to fall within some broad,
30. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51 (emphasis in original).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 56 n.6. A dying declaration is when "[iln a prosecution for homicide or in a
civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the decla-
rant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant'
believed to be impending death." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
34. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. Regarding the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception, the
Court stated that "the existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law
cannot be disputed." Id. Forfeiture by wrongdoing is "[a] statement offered against a party
that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
35. Crawford, 542 U.S. at 52-54.
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modern, hearsay exception, even if that exception might
be justifiable in other circumstances. 6
While the Supreme Court never defined "testimonial" in a clear
and concise way, Justice Scalia alluded to potential definitions,
indicating that "testimonial" statements included affidavits, cus-
todial examinations, prior testimony, or other pretrial statements
that are anticipated to be used by the prosecution in a criminal
case.37 Nevertheless, the fact that the Crawford Court was never
clear in its description of "testimonial" left open whether a subjec-
tive, objective, or hybrid standard applies, and from whose point of
view (whether it be the declarant, the taker of the statement, or a
hypothetical reasonable person in similar circumstances) it is de-
termined whether a statement is testimonial 8
Justice Scalia attempted to generally define "testimonial," by
first referring to it as meaning "a solemn declaration or affirma-
tion made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."39
He further expanded upon this definition, proclaiming that "an
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual re-
mark to an acquaintance does not."4 °
Additionally, he acknowledged that there are "various formula-
tions" of the concept and went on to identify three specific types.41
First, Justice Scalia addressed "ex parte in court testimony or its
functional equivalent."' He found that "material such as affida-
vits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pre-trial statements that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pre-trial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially" to fall under the category of "testimonial." 3 Sec-
ond, he referred to "extrajudicial statements ... contained in for-
malized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony or confessions" and deemed these items to be tes-
timonial statements." Third, Justice Scalia addressed "state-
36. Id. at 56.
37. Id. at 51.
38. Id. at 51-52.
39. Id. at 52.




44. Id. at 52.
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ments that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial." 5 Justice Scalia complicated
the matter further by identifying a potential fourth variation
which included "statements taken by police officers in the course
of interrogations.'46
As one can readily see, Justice Scalia's formulations are very
different from one another, especially with respect to the standard
and point of view from which the statement is to be analyzed.47
The third viewpoint is different from the first two in that it re-
quires the view of an outside, objective witness.48 Additionally, the
fact that Justice Scalia did not expand upon and clarify his related
formulations or explain how one interacts with the others leaves
both prosecutors and defense attorneys guessing as to what ex-
actly constitutes a "testimonial" statement.
In trying to reconcile Justice Scalia's open-ended definition of
testimonial statements, lower courts have, and will continue to
struggle to apply the Crawford rule both correctly and consis-
tently. Before examining how other courts have interpreted Craw-
ford, one must generally understand where the Crawford decision
attempts to leave the Confrontation Clause analysis. If a witness
is available, he should testify, and when he does, the requirements
of the Confrontation Clause are met by in-court cross examination.
If a witness is unavailable to testify at trial, his previous state-
ments, if deemed "testimonial," are inadmissible, unless there was
a prior opportunity to cross-examine. This is true regardless of
whether the Federal Rules of Evidence authorize the admission of
the testimonial out-of-court statements.
IV. UNITED STATES V. HENDRICKS AND
SUBSEQUENT THIRD CIRCUIT CASES
In United States v. Hendricks,49 the Third Circuit made its first
attempt to interpret the meaning of "testimonial evidence."" Join-
ing other courts, it held that monitored conversations pursuant to
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
45. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
46. Id. at 52.
47. Id. at 51-52.
48. Id.
49. 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005).
50. Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 180.
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1968"l do not fall under the category of testimonial for purposes of
the Crawford rule. 2
Additionally, the Hendricks court held that
[IIf a [dlefendant or his or her coconspirator makes
statements as part of a. reciprocal and integrated conver-
sation with a government informant who later becomes
unavailable for trial, the Confrontation Clause does not
bar the introduction of the informant's portions of the
conversation as are reasonably required to place the de-
fendant or coconspirator's nontestimonial statements into
context.
5 3
The facts surrounding Hendricks were relatively typical in the
criminal arena. On April 11, 2003, Craig Hendricks was one of
several defendants charged with one or more counts of conspiracy,
narcotics possession and distribution, and money laundering." On
January 12, 2004, the United States filed a motion in limine seek-
ing pretrial rulings pertaining to the admissibility of, inter alia,
electronic surveillance tapes obtained pursuant to a court author-
ized wiretap and recordings of conversations between confidential
informant Hector Rivera (hereinafter "CI Rivera") and various
defendants.55 The United States asserted that these statements
51. Id. at 182.
Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a
duly authorized law enforcement officer must obtain approval from the United
States Attorney General or a designated Assistant Attorney General in order to
apply to a federal judge for approval to intercept and record wire communica-
tions. Once such approval is obtained, the officer must present to a judge a
written application for a wiretap, which must contain an adequate and particu-
larized showing of probable cause. It must also contain a showing of necessity,
and explain why normal investigative techniques would be of no avail. The
Government must further take steps to minimize the monitoring of nonperti-
nent conversations and otherwise to limit invasions of privacy. In the instant
case, the District Court determined that the wiretaps at issue were legally suf-
ficient in terms of authority, probable cause, necessity, and minimization.
Those findings are not before this court.
Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 180-81 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2513 (2004).
52. 220 No. 3 West's Criminal Law News 25 (February 10, 2005).
53. Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 184.
54. Id. at 175. The other defendants were Andy Antoine, Jacquelyn Carr, Rafael Cin-
tron, Rudolph Clark, Elroy Dowe, Daniel Fleming, Randy Laronde, and Russel Robinson.
Id. The indictment indicated that Hendricks was the leader of the large scale narcotics
organization that imported and distributed cocaine throughout the entire United States
Virgin Islands and elsewhere. Id.
55. Id.
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qualified as either admissions by party opponents,56 co-conspirator
statements,57 or as statements covered by the residual hearsay
exception" and were thus admissible at trial.59
In light of the Supreme Court's announcement of the Crawford
rule, the district court concluded that, since the defendants never
had the opportunity to cross-examine CI Rivera, and since CI
Rivera would be unavailable to testify at trial due to his death, the
United States could not introduce the conversations involving CI
Rivera at trial. °
The United States filed a motion for reconsideration, in which it
noted that Crawford applies only to testimonial hearsay state-
ments.61 The government further argued that nontestimonial
hearsay statements are still subject to the Roberts test and may be
admitted on that basis. The district court denied the motion,
finding that the evidence at issue qualified as testimonial and was
thus subject to the Crawford rule. 3
56. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A), which provides:
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony and was given under oath sub-
ject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition.
Id.
57. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that "[a] statement is not
hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id.
58. See FED. R. EVID. 807. The residual exception found in Rule 807 states:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804, but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through rea-
sonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. How-
ever, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the propo-
nent of it makes it known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the
trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare
to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Id.
59. Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 175.
60. Id. at 176. The United States argued that the defendants were responsible for CI
Rivera's death and has thus forfeited by wrongdoing any protection offered by Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Third
Circuit rejected this argument because there was not enough evidence to show that the
defendants did, indeed, cause the death of CI Rivera. Id. at 176 n.5.
61. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68).
62. Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 176.
63. Id.
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The United States then filed an interlocutory appeal, which
brought the issue to the Third Circuit. There, the court said:
The lynchpin of the Crawford decision thus is its distinc-
tion between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay;
simply put, the rule announced in Crawford applies only
to the former category of statements. As the Court ex-
plained: "Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is
wholly consistent with the Framers' decision to afford...
flexibility in the U development of hearsay law - as does
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
statements from the Confrontation Clause scrutiny alto-
gether." Thus, unless a particular hearsay statement
qualifies as "testimonial," Crawford is inapplicable and
Roberts still controls.64
The Third Circuit went on to state that, while the Crawford
Court specifically left open the precise definition of "testimonial,"
it did provide some points of reference.65 The Third Circuit dis-
cussed the four potential definitions of testimonial and stated how
various courts of appeals have struggled with determining the
precise definition of "testimonial" hearsay.66 It discussed examples
of how the courts have defined "testimonial" since Crawford, like
United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero,67 where the First Circuit con-
cluded that a defendant's signed confession, presented under oath
to the prosecutor constituted testimonial hearsay within the defi-
nition of Crawford; United States v. Cromer,' where the Sixth Cir-
cuit found that a statement made knowingly to authorities that
describes criminal activity is almost always testimonial, and con-
cluded that the confidential informant's statement to police that
implicated the defendant in criminal activity was testimonial
hearsay; and United States v. Bruno," in which the Second Circuit
said that a plea allocution transcript and grand jury testimony of
a witness who was unavailable for trial constituted "testimonial"
hearsay.
64. Id. at 179.
65. Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 179. See also United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838
n.1 (8th Cir. 2004).
66. Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 179-80.
67. 390 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2004).
68. 389 F.3d 622, 674 (6th Cir. 2004).
69. 383 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2004).
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After explaining the specific procedure involved in obtaining a
wiretap under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, o the Third Circuit went on to state that the
recorded statements at issue were not similar to any of the exam-
ples of testimonial statements specifically listed by the Supreme
Court in Crawford.71 The court said, however, that even under the
broadest definition of "testimonial," statements made to confiden-
tial informants were not "testimonial" because the declarants
clearly did not make these statements believing that they would
be available for use in a later trial.72 Accordingly, the Hendricks
court found wiretap recordings to be more similar to a "casual re-
mark to an acquaintance" than a formal statement to government
officers, thus making these recordings nontestimonial in nature
and not subject to Crawford.73
Regarding the conversations between the defendants and CI
Rivera, the district court rendered these statements "testimonial"
under the most expansive definition provided by the Crawford
Court.74 The district court reasoned that gaining evidence against
defendants for use as part of an investigation and prosecution was
covered by Crawford.75 On appeal, the Third Circuit admitted that
such an analysis was appealing because the conversations rea-
sonably could have been categorized as involving statements that
CI Rivera expected to be used prosecutorially; however, the Craw-
ford case cited with approval Bourjaily v. United States,"6 a case in
which the Supreme Court rejected a Confrontation Clause argu-
ment regarding communications between a confidential informant
and co-defendant.77 Because these statements constituted admis-
sions by the co-defendant, the circuit court held that they were
clearly nonhearsay and thus not subject to Crawford."8
Under the circumstances in Hendricks, the Third Circuit found
that the government should have been able to introduce the
statements made by CI Rivera to the co-defendant in order to put
the statements made by the other party into context so that the
jury may more readily recognize the co-defendant's statements as
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2005).
71. Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 181.
72. Id. at 181.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 182.
75. Id.
76. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
77. Hendricks, 395 F:3d at 182.
78. Id. at 183.
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admissions. 9 In other words, the statements made by CI Rivera
were not hearsay because they were not out-of-court statements
being offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, they
were being offered for their effect on the hearer.
Soon after the decision in Hendricks, the Third Circuit faced a
similar issue in United States v. Briscoe-Bey,"° where the defen-
dant was convicted for the distribution of more than five hundred
grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B).s' Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Third
Circuit sentenced the defendant to 188 months in jail followed by
a four-year term of supervised release.82 The defendant appealed,83
asserting that the district court violated his rights under the Con-
frontation Clause to confront witnesses against him when it ad-
mitted audiotapes and testimony by a case agent regarding state-
ments made by a government informant who did not testify at
trial because neither party called him as a witness. 8
In response, the Government argued that the defendant did not
point to any place in the record where he objected to any evidence
on the basis of the Confrontation Clause.85 Therefore, the claimed
error was not subject to review. 6
The Third Circuit rejected the Government's position and de-
cided that it would examine the defendant's Confrontation Clause
argument subject to plain error." Noting that the rule from Craw-
ford had recently been applied by the Third Circuit in United
States v. Hendricks, the Third Circuit concluded in one sentence
that there was no Confrontation Clause violation in this case.8
Rather than discussing how Crawford and Hendricks applied to
79. Id. at 184.
80. 126 F. App'x 551 (3d Cir. 2005).
81. Briscoe-Bey, 126 F. App'x at 551. This opinion was not selected for publication in
the Federal Reporter and is not precedential. Id.
82. Id. The defendant's sentencing range was from 155 to 188 months. Id.
83. Id. The defendant appealed his conviction based on two sentencing issues arising
from the application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to his conviction. Id. The defen-
dant argued first that the district court erred in admitting the audiotapes and testimony by
case agent Hughes regarding the statements of government informant because they consti-
tuted inadmissible hearsay, and, second, that the district court violated the defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause to confront the witnesses against him. Id.
84. Id. The government informant was Ernest Morris, the receiver of the cocaine. Id.
85. Id. The defendant did not dispute that he did not raise a Confrontation Clause
argument in the district court. Id.
86. Briscoe-Bey, 126 F. App'x at 551.
87. Id. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 299 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2005).
88. Briscoe-Bey, 126 F. App'x at 551.
Vol. 44
Summer 2006 Confrontation Clause: Where Are We Now? 693
the facts of the case, the court focused on the amount of evidence
against the defendant.89
Regarding whether or not the testimony at issue in Briscoe-Bey
was indeed testimonial, the analysis should have been identical to
that of Hendricks. The declarant, the defendant in Briscoe-Bey, did
not, at the time of making the statement, reasonably expect that
the statement might be used in further judicial proceedings. The
defendant made the statements for one purpose only: to sell nar-
cotics. Accordingly, these statements were akin to that of the de-
fendant to CI Rivera in Hendricks. Why then did the Third Circuit
not just explain that the statements at issue were not subject to
Crawford because they are nontestimonial? Furthermore, why did
the court fail to mention that the government should have been
able to introduce the statements made by the informant to the co-
defendant in order to put the statements made by the other party
into perspective? This would have permitted the jury to more
readily recognize the defendant's statements as admissions.
Rather than mirroring its analysis in Hendricks, the circuit
court said that proper consideration had been given to Crawford
and Hendricks, and it, instead, focused on the substantial amount
of evidence against the defendant. Where does amount of evi-
dence against the defendant have any place in a Confrontation
Clause analysis according to Crawford? Such a fundamental right
embedded in the Bill of Rights should not and cannot be out-
weighed by any amount of evidence.
Where does this leave the Third Circuit in its application of
Crawford and Hendricks? Are prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
others just supposed to sick back idle and not question the Third
Circuit's unexplained application of the Crawford rule? Even
though there was a large amount of evidence against the defen-
dant in Briscoe-Bey, does a potential violation of the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
not warrant some explanation? If the Confrontation Clause was
violated, such error would be irreversible due to the important
nature of the right violated.
89. Id. The Third Circuit found the evidence against the defendant to be overwhelming
and instead of setting forth that evidence at length, the court quoted a portion of a conver-
sation between the defendant and the governmental informant. Id. The majority opinion
concluded by saying nothing more than that the conversation reflected the initiation of a
narcotics transaction. Id. Even though there was "overwhelming evidence against the
defendant," the Third Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded' the case to district court
to address the defendant's contentions. Id.
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Furthermore, what role does potential poor lawyering play in
the Confrontation Clause analysis? Why would neither party call
the governmental informant to testify, and how, if at all, does that
affect the application of the Crawford rule?
The Third Circuit had the opportunity to revisit its decisions in
Hendricks and Brisco-Bey in the case called United States v. John-
son.9" In Johnson, the defendant had been convicted of numerous
drug charges which he appealed, claiming that the admission of
recorded conversations between himself and co-conspirators vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses because
the co-conspirators did not testify, and the government did not
show that the co-conspirators were unavailable.9'
The Government argued that there were three types of state-
ments on the tapes that had been admitted, all of which were ad-
missible under the Federal Rules of Evidence as some type of non-
hearsay.92 In response, the court noted that the appellant did not
challenge the admissibility of such evidence under the Federal
Rules of Evidence; rather, appellant focused his appeal on the
rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause, and those rights are
not satisfied by the requirements provided by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.93
The Third Circuit relied on the fact that the Supreme Court had
limited its holding in Crawford to "testimonial" statements,94 and
as such the previous jurisprudence from Ohio v. Roberts, which
allowed the admission of nontestimonial statements, remained
intact. Accordingly, the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling of the
district court and found that the admission of the statements
without requiring the prosecution to show unavailability did not
90. 119 F. App'x 415 (3d Cir. 2005). This case was not selected for the Federal Reporter
and is not precedential. Johnson, 119 F. App'x at 415.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 417. First, the statements of the appellant himself are admissions by a party
opponent, admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). Id. Second, statements
of individuals other than appellant recorded from a wiretap constitute statements made by
a co-conspirator and are admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Id.
Third, the statements of the confidential informant fall under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(c) as nonhearsay because they were not being offered for the truth of the matter as-
serted; rather, they were offered to provide context to appellant's admissions. Id.
93. Id. at 417-18. In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court warned that "leaving
the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confron-
tation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices." Id. at
419 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
94. Johnson, 119 F. App'x at 416.
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violate the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights and did not
constitute plain error.95
Before examining the application of Crawford, the Third Circuit
discussed the case of United States v. Inadi,"6 where the Supreme
Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not require the
government to show that co-conspirators were unavailable as a
condition to admit wiretap recordings.97 The Third Circuit went
on to state that Johnson, the appellant in this case, was urging
the court to extend Crawford to apply to all out-of-court state-
ments. In other words, both "testimonial" and nontestimonial
statements would be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 9
In response, the Third Circuit relied upon its recent decision in
United States v. Hendricks.99 The trial court in Hendricks had
stated that Crawford applied to "testimonial" evidence only and
excluded wiretap statements as "testimonial," applying the defini-
tion of testimonial too broadly.' ° On appeal, the Third Circuit re-
versed the trial court's ruling, recognizing the Supreme Court's
intent to maintain a distinction between "testimonial" and nontes-
timonial statements in the application of the Crawford rule.'
The Johnson court went on to explain in detail how the Craw-
ford Court emphasized the important historical distinction be-
tween "testimonial" and nontestimonial statements. Quoting
Crawford, the court stated:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States
flexibility in their development in hearsay law ....
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law re-
95. Id. at 419.
96. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
97. Johnson, 119 F. App'x at 418 (citing Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400).
98. Johnson, 119 F. App'x at 418.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Third Circuit went on to quote Justice Scalia's majority opinion with re-
gard to the Confrontation Clause in Crawford, stating that "[tihe constitutional text, like
the history underlying the common-law right to confrontation, thus reflects an especially
acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement." Id. (emphasis added).
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quired: unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-
102examine.
The Third Circuit concluded by stating that since Hendricks
held that wiretap statements and statements of defendants or
their co-conspirators made during conversations with confidential
informants are nontestimonial in nature, none of the statements
contained in the recordings at issue fit the definition of "testimo-
nial. ,0 3
Although Johnson was decided only seven days after
Hendricks,'4 Johnson illustrates the confusion that often results
from the application of the Crawford rule in determining whether
or not an out-of-court statement is "testimonial" or nontestimo-
nial. While the analyses in both Hendricks and Johnson are con-
sistent with Crawford 'and one another, one has to wonder
whether the Crawford rule will one day be extended to all out-of-
court statements, "testimonial" and nontestimonial alike, so as to
avoid the confusion that results when trying to draw the fine line
between the two categories of statements.
In attempts to minimize confusion and to keep evidentiary
analysis separate and distinct from that of Confrontation Clause
analysis, the Third Circuit never mentioned how the statements
at issue were admissible pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence."°5 Where does that fact, if at all, fall into the court's appli-
102. Id. at 419.
103. Johnson, 119 F. App'x at 419.
104. Hendricks was decided on January 14, 2005, and Johnson was decided on January
21, 2005.
105. All of the statements at issue should have been admissible as nonhearsay, or ex-
emptions to the hearsay rule:
Statements which are not hearsay include (1) when a declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement
and the statement is: (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was
given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of re-
cent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a
person made after perceiving that person or if the statement is offered against
a party. Statements which are not hearsay also include a statement which is
offered against the party and (A) is the party's own statement in either an in-
dividual or representative capacity or (B) a statement in which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person au-
thorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a
statement made by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relation-
ship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
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cation of the Crawford rule? Case law seems to suggest that this
fact is irrelevant to the Crawford analysis; however, the difference
between hearsay and nonhearsay should not amount to a distinc-
tion without a difference, as it may be determinative of admissibil-
ity.
V. PENNSYLVANIA: COMMONWEALTH V. LEVANDUSKI
AND COMMONWEALTH V. GRAY
In Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 6 the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania applied the Crawford rule in a very strict manner. 7 In
Levanduski, appellant Terry Lynn Levanduski appealed her sen-
tence to life imprisonment following her conviction by a jury for
charges of first-degree murder of her common law husband, con-
spiracy, hindering apprehension, and solicitation.' When Levan-
duski returned home from work on November 22, 2002, the police
were at her house and were conducting an investigation because a
body had been found there.' °9 The police had obtained valid search
warrants and during their search of Levanduski's home they dis-
covered, inter alia, a ripped-up five page handwritten note in the
kitchen trash can."0 Further investigation revealed that the note
had been written by the by the victim, concerning his suspicion
that the appellant and her paramour,"' Leonard Fansen, were
conspiring to murder him."'
Prior to trial, Levanduski filed a motion in limine to preclude
the admission into evidence of the letter which had been discov-
ered in the trash can.' This motion was granted in part and de-
FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
106. 2005 Pa. Super. 117 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). The opinion previously reported at this
citation has been removed from the Lexis service at the request of the court. Id. This opin-
ion was withdrawn after reargument was granted en banc on May 27, 2005. Id.
107. Levanduski, 2005 Pa. Super. at 117.
108. Levanduski, 2005 Pa. Super. at **1. The charges resulted from appellant's homi-
cide of her common law husband, Robert Sandt, on November 2, 2002. Id.
109. Id. Sandt died as a result of a seven .22 caliber gun shot wounds, five of which
went into his head. Sandt's body was found by a next door neighbor, appellant's mother.
At the time appellant's mother discovered the body, appellant was at her place of employ-
ment. Id. at **1-2.
110. Id. at **2. The letter at issue here was fairly long, consisting of five pages, hand-
written, describing how the victim had discovered that the appellant was having sexual
relations with the co-defendant. Id. at **6.
111. A paramour is "one taking the place without the legal rights of a husband or wife."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1638 (1986).
112. Levanduski, 2005 Pa. Super. at **2.
113. Id. Appellant also filed a motion to suppress her statements to the police prior to
trial. Id. The motion to suppress was denied. Id.
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nied in part.114 The trial judge held that the content of the letter
could not be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted
therein, but it could be admitted as evidence of motive to show the
relationship of the co-defendants.115 On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court examined closely the rationale of the trial judge,
and in support of his ruling, stated:
The letter written by the victim, which implicated defen-
dants Levanduski and Fransen, meets this definition [of
hearsay]. It was not made by the victim through testi-
mony at a trial or hearing and it is being offered to prove
that defendant Levanduski conspired to kill him. Be-
cause the letter does not fall within any exception to the
hearsay rule, it is inadmissible at trial to prove the de-
fendant Levanduski's involvement in the murder of the
victim."
6
With respect to the admissibility of the content of the letter as
evidence of motive, the superior court went on to reiterate the trial
court's findings that "when an extrajudicial statement is offered
for a purpose other than proving the truth of its contents, it is not
hearsay and is not excludable under the hearsay rule.""7 The Su-
perior Court of Pennsylvania rejected this rationale and asserted
that the letter constituted nothing more than evidence of the truth
of the matter asserted."' After determining that the letter did not
fall into a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the superior
court concluded that the trial court's refusal to preclude admission
of this letter into evidence constituted reversible error, and a new
trial was granted. 9
In the Levanduski court's opinion, the Crawford rule was ad-
dressed only briefly in a footnote regarding the potential applica-
bility of the forfeiture exception to the hearsay rules to admit the
letter.2 ° There, the court simply stated that Crawford held that
114. Id.
115. Id. at **4. A jury trial followed, and at its conclusion, Levanduski was found guilty,
inter alia, of murder in the first degree and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Le-
vanduski, 2005 Pa. Super. at **2.
116. Id. at **9.
117. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Puksar, 740 A.2d 219, 225 (Pa. 1999)) (additional
citation omitted).
118. Levanduski, 2005 Pa. Super. at **9-10.
119. Id. **23. The court stated that the content was only relevant if the truth of the
statements was accepted, and accordingly, it constituted hearsay. Id.
120. Id. at **16 n.7.
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the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution pre-
cludes the admission of hearsay "except in the most limited cir-
cumstances" with respect to "testimonial" statements.'21 The court
pointed out that the Supreme Court in Crawford did not specifi-
cally define the terms "testimonial" and nontestimonial, but made
it clear that "testimonial" statements referred to those "state-
ments made by a declarant who at the time of making the state-
ment would reasonably expect that the statement might be used
in future judicial proceedings."'22 The superior court agreed with
the trial judge that the letter at issue fell into the category of non-
testimonial statements because it was not given under oath or af-
firmation at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.'23
While the letter was determined to be nontestimonial, it is still
important to examine the court's interpretation of the Crawford
rule and its reasons as to why it did not apply to the case at hand.
After reviewing the court's analysis addressed above, the question
becomes how did the court know that the victim did not write that
letter reasonably expecting the statement to be used in subse-
quent judicial proceedings? It seems logical that if one was in
great fear that he was going to be murdered, he might want to
leave some sort of record of his thoughts behind so as to aid the
police in their investigation with the hopes that such record would
be used in judicial proceedings.
Furthermore, Crawford provided that statements made under
oath or affirmation at trial or in an affidavit or deposition are
merely examples of testimonial statements.'24 Nowhere in the
Crawford opinion did the Supreme Court specifically limit "testi-
monial" statements to such a narrow category, yet lower courts
have seemed to do just that and have justified their actions by cit-
ing to Crawford. It seems as though lower courts are afraid to
expand the definition of testimonial beyond the few examples pro-
vided in Crawford.
In Commonwealth v. Gray,"5 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
had the opportunity to examine the effect, if any, of the Confronta-
tion Clause on the admissibility of hearsay testimony pursuant to
the excited utterance exception under Federal Rule of Evidence
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004)) (internal
quotations omitted).
123. Levanduski, 2005 Pa. Super. at **16 n.7.
124. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
125. 867 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
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803(2).126 In Gray, the appellant claimed that the trial court
abused it discretion when it admitted out-of-court statements by
the victim and another person in violation of the Confrontation
Clause.12 7 The record revealed that the out-of-court statements
qualified as excited utterances, and as such, they did not fall into
the category of "an extrajudicial statement contained in formal-
ized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions," nor did those statements constitute
"ex-parte in court testimony or its functional equivalent."28
The closest question was whether the statements fell within the
category that the declarant "would have reasonably expected her
statements to have been used prosecutorially."'29 On this issue,
the superior court noted:
[IUn determining whether the statement was made with
the reasonable expectation that it would be used in a
prosecution, the [Crawford] court focused on the purpose
of the statement and its intended effect, not the proce-
dural context in which the statement was made.
The Gray court went on to discuss how other courts have dealt
with the issue of whether excited utterances, made to police at the
scene of a crime, would qualify as testimonial statements.'' Some
courts have held that such statements do not constitute testimo-
nial statements.3 2 Other post-Crawford decisions have held that
excited utterances are per se nontestimonial. Relying on State v.
Lopez, 3 ' the Gray court stated that "[wihether a statement falls
within the third category of testimonial statements identified in
Crawford depends upon the purpose for which the statement was
made, not the emotional state of the declarant." 3'
In Gray, the excited utterance was unsolicited; it was made to
the police in order to obtain assistance during the commission of a
crime. 1' Because the declarant volunteered information in an ef-
126. Gray, 867 A.2d at 569.
127. Id. at 572.
128. Id. at 574 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52).
129. Gray, 867 A.2d at 574.
130. Id. at 576 (quoting Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004)).
131. Gray, 867 A.2d at 576.
132. Id. at 575.
133. 888 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
134. Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 699.
135. Gray, 867 A.2d at 577.
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fort to remedy a perceived emergency and not to create a record
against another for use in a future prosecution, the court con-
cluded that this statement was nontestimonial"' To support this
conclusion, the court noted that the police officers did not ask the
declarant any questions and did not write down any of her state-
ments. "' 7 Since the declarant's statements did not arise during a
formal, structured police interrogation, the court could not con-
clude that an objective witness would reasonably expect the
statements to be available for use at a later trial.13
Clearly, the court's explanation as to why an excited utterance
does not constitute information that an objective witness would
reasonably expect to be available for use at later judicial proceed-
ings narrowed the scope of the definition of "testimonial" from
Crawford. The Gray court was very willing to analyze the state-
ment at issue under each definition of testimonial provided by
Justice Scalia in Crawford. However, since the courts are not uni-
fied in their treatment of excited utterances, how has the Craw-
ford rule simplified Confrontation Clause jurisprudence? Are we
not left with the same confusion and lack of clarity that we suf-
fered from the application of the Roberts rule?
Furthermore, the Gray court applied a strictly objective stan-
dard in its analysis. It seems likely that the outcome would have
been different had the applied standard been subjective or a com-
bination of both objective and subjective reasoning in determining
whether the out-of-court statements at issue were "testimonial."
Would the court have been able to explain the application of Craw-
ford had it chosen the liberal, subjective standard in this case?
This is just one of the many questions that future analysis and
modification of the Crawford rule will hopefully be able to answer.
The remainder of this comment considers selected cases from
other circuit courts to demonstrate how they applied, or chose not
to apply, Crawford. It is important to note that, while many of
these cases were not focused entirely on the Crawford issue, they
illustrate the confusion and uncertainty that still remains in de-






VI. FIRST CIRCUIT: HORTON V. ALLEN
In Horton v. Allen,'39 the First Circuit Court of Appeals had a
rather easy application of the Crawford rule. There, the petitioner
was a prison inmate who had been sentenced to a concurrent life
term of imprisonment for two first-degree murders as well as a
ten-to-fifteen-year term for assault.4 ' On appeal, Horton argued,
inter alia, that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
was violated when the trial court admitted certain hearsay testi-141H
mony. Over Horton's objection, the trial court admitted testi-
mony from a man by the name of Henry Garcia."' Garcia had said
that on the day of the murders of the victims (Manuel and Desir)
Horton's accomplice, Christian, had stated that "he needed money
and that Desir had refused to give him drugs on credit."' The
trial court judge had admitted this testimony under the present
state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule.
44
At oral argument, the application of Crawford to Horton's peti-
tion was debated.' 45 The First Circuit did not address the issue of
whether Crawford was retroactive because, in affirming the trial
court's decision, it held that the Crawford rule did not apply to
this case. 14 After briefly discussing how the Crawford rule draws
a fine line between "testimonial" and nontestimonial statements,
the court determined that Christian's statements did not qualify
as "testimonial."' 47 The court explained that Christian's state-
ments during a private conversation with Garcia were not made
139. 370 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004).
140. Horton, 370 F.3d at 79. Horton subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which
was denied, and his subsequent direct appeal and his appeal from the denial of his new
trial were also denied. Id.
141. Id. Horton's appeal raised three claims. His two other arguments were that the
"trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by holding the individual
voir dire of potential jurors in an anteroom rather than a court room;" and that his Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel was violated because his "counsel did not call certain
alibi witnesses and failed to interview certain potential character witnesses." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 83.
144. See Commonwealthv. Horton, 753 N.E.2d 119, 125 (Mass. 2001).
145. Horton, 370 F.3d at 83.
The debate in this instance was important especially because the new rules of
criminal procedure do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings unless: (1) the
rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe,
or (2) the rule is a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure, implicating funda-
mental fairness and accuracy of the proceeding.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 84.
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under circumstances in which an objective person would "reasona-
bly believe that the statements would be available for use at a
later trial."14 Because Christian's statements were nontestimo-
nial, they fell outside of the scope of Crawford, and the First Cir-
cuit applied Roberts to determine whether the admission of Chris-
tian's nontestimonial hearsay statements violated Horton's rights
under the Confrontation Clause.9
VII. SECOND CIRCUIT: UNITED STATES V. BRUNO
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated its willing-
ness to follow the United States' Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford. In United States v. Bruno,"' the defendants appealed
the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, convicting them of conspiracy and racketeer-
ing charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Or-
ganizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racket-
eering Act (VCAR). "'
As to the portion of the decision that related to Crawford and
the Confrontation Clause, the convictions for false-statement con-
spiracy were vacated because the district court committed plain
error in admitting hearsay evidence, a plea allocution, and grand
jury testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause."2
The Bruno court reiterated the rule from Crawford and further
relied on Crawford's analysis to reach its conclusion that the plea
allocution and grand jury testimony was testimonial evidence ad-
mitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause.'53 Quoting Craw-
ford, the Bruno Court stated "the Crawford Court identified ear-
lier lower federal court cases where testimonial statements had
been admitted in contravention of its interpretation of the Con-
148. Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).
149. Horton, 370 F.3d at 84. Applying Roberts, the First Circuit noted first that the
admission of Christian's statement fell within Roberts because Christian was unavailable
to testify and the statements fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception for statements
evidencing the declarant's mental state. Id. at 85. The First Circuit agreed with many
other courts that the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule shall constitute a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. Id.
150. 383 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2004).
151. Bruno, 383 F.3d at 77. These convictions included charges for making false state-
ments and the obstruction of justice. Id.
152. Id. at 92.
153. Id. at 77-80. "Specifically, the [Crawford] Court held that testimonial statements of
witnesses absent from trial [are to be] admitted only where the declarant is unavailable,
and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine." Id. at 78
(internal citations omitted).
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frontation Clause, including cases where a 'plea allocution showed
[the] existence of a conspiracy and cases involving the admission
of grand jury testimony.m
154
While the government did not dispute the applicability of Craw-
ford to Bruno, it argued its position from a procedural standpoint:
the government asserted that the Second Circuit's review was lim-
ited to plain error.'55 The Second Circuit rejected this argument
and found the admission of the plea allocution and grand jury tes-
timony to be plain error and exercised its discretion to vacate the
convictions pertaining to the false-statement conspiracy
charged.'56
VIII. FIFTH CIRCUIT: UNITED STATES V. ROBINSON
In United States v. Robinson,'57 the Fifth Circuit discussed the
admission of certain nonhearsay testimony yet still made note of
the Crawford rule. After being found guilty of murder and com-
plicity in an ongoing criminal enterprise, Robinson challenged on
appeal, inter alia, the admission of certain testimony at his sen-
tencing hearing. 5 ' Specifically, Robinson objected to a portion of
the testimony of a man named Michael Williams, "a government
informant whose testimony was used to prove the non-statutory
aggravating factor that Robinson posed a future danger to the
lives and safety of other persons." "'
The government successfully argued that the district court had
properly admitted the hearsay testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which applies to statements made by a co-
conspirator during the course of, and in furtherance of the con-
spiracy."'
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the evidence was admissible as
a co-conspirator's statement. 6' The only mention of the Crawford
154. Id. (internal citations omitted) (italics in original).
155. Id. at 78.
156. Bruno, 383 F.3d at 78.
157. 367 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2004).
158. Robinson, 367 F.3d at 282, 291.
159. Id. at 292. Michael Williams was also known as "One Love." Id.
160. Id. at 291-92. "The proponent of the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E), must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) the existence of a conspir-
acy, (2) the statement was made by a co-conspirator, (3) the statement was made during
the course of the conspiracy, and (4) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspir-
acy." Robinson, 367 F.3d at 292 (quoting United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 433 (5th Cir.
2002)).
161. Robinson, 367 F.3d at 292.
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rule came in the middle of a footnote in the case, where after stat-
ing its conclusion that the testimony was admissible, the court
noted that "[a]s applied to the present case, this conclusion is not
called into doubt by Crawford v. Washington, because the state-
ment challenged as hearsay was made during the course of a con-
spiracy and is non-testimonial in nature."'62 The court did not talk
about Crawford's application to this case or how, if at all, it differs
from other applications of Crawford regarding the admission of
statements made by co-conspirators during the course of and in
furtherance of a conspiracy.
While the Court's decision in Robinson is entirely consistent
with Crawford, it is shocking that the court even mentioned Craw-
ford anywhere in its opinion. If the court was going to mention
Crawford as it did, why did it not elaborate more on its analysis or
clear up any confusion in its finding that Crawford does not apply?
Several circuit courts have made it clear that statements which
qualify as "exempted hearsay" can never be testimonial, but can
there ever be an exception? If not, why was Crawford even men-
tioned in cases regarding "exempted hearsay"?
IX. EIGHTH CIRCUIT: UNITED STATES V. REYES
In United States v. Reyes,"6 3 an informant approached members
of a Missouri drug task force and notified them of drug activity in
a local trailer park." Based on this information, undercover offi-
cers and other informants were employed to investigate the situa-
tion further."5 Defendant Juan Reyes was approached by an in-
formant named Cooper. 6 After discovering that Cooper was a
drug dealer, Reyes "gave Cooper a gun and asked him to deliver it
to Reyes' family in Mexico."6 7 The other defendant in this case,
Samuel Burton, also engaged in a drug transaction with officers
and informants.'68
A grand jury indicted the defendants along with many other
conspiracy participants.'69 Both Reyes and Burton were linked to
the conspiracy through the statements that Caasimoro Gonzalez
162. Id. at 292 n.20 (internal citations omitted).
163. 362 F.3d 536 (Sth Cir. 2004).





169. Reyes, 362 F.3d at 540.
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made to the undercover agents while the conspiracy was taking
place. 7 ' Although the grand jury had indicted Gonzalez, he pled
guilty before the defendants' trial, but had not yet been sentenced
at that time."' Rather than calling Gonzalez as a witness, the
government introduced Gonzalez's out-of-court statements
through officers who testified about what Gonzalez told them
about the defendants.' In response to defense counsel calling
Gonzalez as a witness, Gonzalez invoked the Fifth Amendment.'
The district court admitted Gonzalez's out-of-court statements,
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that that the trial court
did not err by refusing to strike the testimony about Gonzalez's
statements.74  The court stated that "the Confrontation Clause
does not give the defendant the right to cross-examine a person
who does not testify at trial and whose statements are introduced
under the co-conspirator hearsay exclusion."'75 Furthermore, the
court recognized that the only way the defendants could prevail
under the Confrontation Clause would have been for them to show
that they had a right to cross-examine Gonzalez due to the re-
counting of his testimony by police officers.'76 This was impossible
because the statement is clearly nontestimonial. 77 The Eighth
Circuit noted:
Burton cites a recent Supreme Court decision [Crawford]
to support his Confrontation Clause argument. Crawford
does not support his argument, however, because co-
conspirator statements are nontestimonial. Crawford did
not provide additional protection for nontestimonial
statements, and indeed, questioned whether the Confron-
tation Clause protects nontestimonial statements at
all . . . ." Federal Rule of Evidence 801 characterizes out-
of-court statements by coconspirators as exemptions
from, rather than exceptions to the hearsay rule.





174. Reyes, 362 F.3d at 540.
175. Id. at 541.
176. Id. at 540.
177. Id. at 541.
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The list of post-Crawford decisions will continue to grow as
courts desperately try to interpret Justice Scalia's various defini-
tions of "testimonial" from Crawford v. Washington. With so
many exceptions to the general admissibility of hearsay as well as
statements that constitute "exempted hearsay," such as admis-
sions by party opponents and co-conspirators' statements made in
furtherance of a conspiracy, it is likely that the formulation of the
Crawford rule will continue to develop and change over time.
The Supreme Court in Crawford created a great deal of uncer-
tainty as to the impact of the Confrontation Clause on the admis-
sibility of out-of-court statements in criminal cases by providing
four potential formulations of what is "testimonial." Each time a
judge admits exceptional hearsay, it is likely that the defendant
will raise a Confrontation Clause issue with the hopes of reversal.
It seems that Crawford's uncertainty will result not only in an
increase in litigation, but also more confusion for the courts in de-
termining the fine line between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements. Eventually, the broadest definition of "testimonial,"
that statements being made with reasonable expectation that they
would be used in subsequent prosecution, will likely either be re-
defined or deleted in its entirety.
At the very least, our Supreme Court eventually needs to define
more clearly from whose perspective this subjective, objective, or
hybrid standard should be viewed. Is it from the subjective point
of view of the declarant, the taker of the statement, or an outside
objective person in the position of the declarant? In an area of the
law as fundamental as Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, circuit
courts should not be left to guess which standard of "testimonial"
should apply. Without further clarification, we are no better off
than we were with the lack of consistency produced by the Roberts
rule.
Michelle A. Mantine
178. Id. at 540 n.4 & 5 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).

